One World mathematical Game Theory Seminar

07 Apr One World mathematical Game Theory Seminar

Posted at 11:35h in by Galit Ashkenazi-Golan 0 Comments

The One World Mathematical Game Theory Seminar is an international online seminar whose goal is keeping our research community connected, allowing people to regularly meet and exchange ideas.

This seminar is a part of One World Seminars, currently held in probability, PDEs, Data driven maths, Waves, Mathematical Methods for Arbitrary Data Source (MADS), IMAGing and INvErse problem (IMAGINE) and Optimization.

The seminar takes place biweekly, on Mondays at 15:00 CEST.
From the 30th of November – NEW! A short junior talk before the regular seminar talk.

Our next meeting:

September 5, 15:00 CEST, Yakov Babichenko, Technion

Title: A Population’s Feasible Posterior Beliefs

Abstract: We consider a population of Bayesian agents who share a common prior over some finite state space and each agent is exposed to some information about the state. We ask which distributions over empirical distributions of posteriors beliefs in the population are feasible. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for feasibility. We apply this result in several domains. First, we study the problem of maximizing the polarization of beliefs in a population. Second, we provide a characterization of the feasible agent-symmetric product distributions of posteriors. Finally, we study an instance of a private Bayesian persuasion problem and provide a clean formula for the sender’s optimal value.

Joint work with Itai Arieli

Most past talks and other related content can be found in our youtube channel.

To join the seminar’s mailing list, click here and fill the basic details. In case the link changes, we will send the new one by e-mail and post it on this page.

Please contact one of the organizers if you have an exciting project you would like to share with the community.

The organizers:
Xavier Venel, Ziv Hellman, Eilon Solan, János Flesch, Miklós Pintér, Galit Ashkenazi-Golan

Previous seminars:

for the abstracts click here

Speaker

Topic

Video of meeting

April 6

15:00 CEST

John Levy, University of Glasgow

Uniformly Supported Approximate Equilibria in Families of Games

April 20

15:00 CEST

Bernhard von Stengel, LSE

Algorithms for Rank-1 Bimatrix Games

slides (updated)

May 4

15:00 CEST

Jörgen Weibull, Stockholm School of Economics

Does Moral Play Equilibrate?

May 18

15:00 CEST

Ehud Kalai, Northwestern University

Viable Nash Equilibria: Formation and Defection

June 1

15:00 CEST

Dov Samet, Tel-Aviv University

Monologues, Dialogues and Common Priors

June 15

15:00 CEST

Yannai Gonczarowski. Microsoft Research

To Infinity and Beyond: Scaling Economic Theories via Logical Compactness

June 29

15:00 CEST

Jérôme Renault, Toulouse School of Economics

Long Information Design

July 13

15:00 CEST

Panayotis Mertikopoulos,
INRIA, Grenoble

Games, Dynamics and Optimization

July 27

15:00 CEST

Johannes Hörner,
Yale

Too Much of a Goof Thing? The Dynamics of Trust and Loyalty

August 10

15:00 CEST

Rida Laraki, CNRS (Dauphine-PSL) and U. Liverpool

On Sustainable Equilibria

August 24

15:00 CEST

George J. Mailath, University of Pennsylvania & ANU

Coalition-Proof Risk Sharing
Under Frictions

September 7

15:00 CEST

Robert J. Aumann,
The Hebrew University

A Synthesis of Behavioural and Mainstream Economics

September 21

15:00 CEST

Massimo Marinacci,
Bocconi University

Making Decisions Under Model Misspecification

October 5

15:00 CEST

Eran Shmaya,
Stony Brook University

Choosing a Project under Partial Truth

October 19

15:00 CEST

Bruno Ziliotto,
Paris Dauphine

Absorbing games with incomplete information on both sides and the Mertens conjectures

November 2

15:00 CEST

Stephen Morris, MIT

Implementation Via Information Design in Binary-Action Supermodular Games

November 9

15:00 CEST

Costis Daskalakis, MIT

Special issue

video of gamenet day and the seminar

November 16

15:00 CEST

Miklos Pinter, Corvinus University

Charges and Bets: A General Characterization of Common Priors

November 30
Junior talk

Przemyslaw Siemaszko, SGH Warsaw School of Economics.

Global Games on Social Networks of Information Exchange

November 30
Main talk

Harry Pei, Northwestern University.

Reputation Building under Observational Learning.

December 14 Junior talk

Orin Munk,
Tel-Aviv University

Sunspot Equilibrium in Absorbing Games

December 14 Main talk

Philippe Jehiel,
Paris School of Economics

Analogy-based expectation equilibrium and related concepts: Theory, applications, and beyond.

December 28 Main talk

Yakov Babichenko, Technion, Israel Institute of Technology

Optimal Persuasion via Bi-Pooling

January 11 talk

Marco Scarsini,
LUISS

Pure Nash Equilibria and Best-Response Dynamics in Random Games

January 25 Junior talk

Ilan Nehama,
Bar-Ilan University

Manipulation-resistant false-name-proof facility location mechanisms for complex graphs

January 25 Main talk

Sylvain Sorin, Sorbonne Universitè

On some continuous time algorithms in optimization and game theory

abstract, slides

February 5 Junior talk

Yevgeny Tsodikovich,
Aix-Marseille

Games with Switching Costs, Stationary vs. History Dependent Strategies

February 5 Main talk

Larry Samuelson, Yale

Substitutes

February 22 Junior talk

Lucas Pahl, University of Bonn

A Finite Characterization of Perfect Equilibrium

February 22 Main talk

Ron Peretz, Bar Ilan University

Robust Naive Learning in Social Networks,

March 8 Junior talk

Felipe Garrido Lucero, Paris Dauphine

Stable Matching Games

abstract

March 8 Main talk

Eilon Solan Tel-Aviv University

Equilibria in Repeated Games with Countably Many Players and Tail-Measurable Payoffs,

March 22 Main talk

Lukasz Wozny, Warsaw School of Economics

Time consistent equilibria in dynamic models with recursive payoffs and behavioral discounting,,

April 4 Main talk

Kalyan Chatterjee, Penn State University

Time consistent equilibria in Learning with Limited Memory: Bayesianism vs Heuristics,

April 19 Main talk

Andrés Perea, Maastricht University

A Foundation for Expected Utility in Decision Problems and Games,

May 3 Main talk

David Lagziel, Ben-Gurion University

Screening: Optimal Methods and Anomalies

May 17 Main talk

Pierpaolo Battigalli, Bocconi University

Beliefs, Plans, and Perceived Intentions in Dynamic Games

May 31 Main talk

Arkadi Predtetchinski, Maastricht University

Random Perfect Information Games

June 14 Main talk

Sambuddha Ghosh, Boston University

Blackwell equilibrium

September 6
Main talk

Stephan Jagau,
University of California

Understanding Transfinite Elimination of Non-Best Replies

September 20
Main talk

Tao Wang, Nanjing Audit University

The Tree Model: Learning, Stochastic Dominance and Subjective Option Evaluation

October 4
Main talk

Dov Samet, Tel-Aviv University

What is Common to Common Knowledge and Common Priors?

October 18
Main talk

Igal Milchtaich, Bar-Ilan University

Best-Response Equilibrium: An Equilibrium in Finitely Additive Mixed Strategies

November 1
Main talk

Dries Vermeulen, Maastricht University

A New Characterization of Regular Equilibrium

November 15
Main talk

Abraham Neyman, The Hebrew University

Robust Optimization, Correlated Equilibrium, and Equilibrium

December 13
Main talk

Tristan Tomala, HEC Paris

Information Design in Large Games

January 10
Main talk

Omer Tamuz, Caltech

Private Private Information

January 24
Main talk

Klaus Ritzberger, Royal Holloway, University of London

Solid Outcomes in Finite Games

February 7
Main talk

Ehud Kalai, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern

Best-Response Reasoning Leads to Critical-Mass Equilibria

February 21
Main talk

Robert J. Aumann, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Back to Backward Induction

March 7
Junior talk

Rafael Veiel, MIT

Strategic Type Spaces

March 7
Main talk

Olivier Gossner, Ecole Polytechnique and LSE

Rationalizable Distributions in Games with Incomplete Information

April 7
Main talk

Philip J. Reny, University of Chicago

Efficient Matching in the School Choice Problem

April 18
Main talk

Takuo Sugaya, Stanford

Informational Requirements for Cooperation

May 2
Main talk

Segev Wasserkrug, IBM research

Game Theoretical Gaps for Practical Multi Party Decision Making

May 30
Main talk

Eilon Solan, Tel-Aviv University

Identifying the Deviator

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